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Abstract
We use a micro dataset that collects information across individuals, coun-
tries, and time to investigate the determinants of entrepreneurial activity in
thirty-seven developed and developing nations. We focus both on individ-
ual characteristics and on countries’ regulatory differences. We show that
individual characteristics, such as gender, age, and status in the workforce
are important determinants of entrepreneurship, and we also highlight the
relevance of social networks, self-assessed skills, and attitudes toward risk.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that regulation plays a critical role, particularly for those
individuals who become entrepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity. The
individual characteristics that are impacted most by regulation are those mea-
suring working status, social network, business skills, and attitudes toward
risk.
1 Introduction
The regulatory and legal environment is commonly held to be an important factor
in determining a country’s economic performance. Tight regulation of product and
labor markets is one of the most frequently cited reasons for slower growth and
∗We would like to thank David Blanchﬂower, Boyan Jovanovic, Leora Klapper, Josh Lerner,
Norman Loyaza, Maria Luengo-Prado, Ramana Nanda, Ana Maria Oviedo, Paul Reynolds, Fabio
Schiantarelli, Antoinette Schoar, and Luis Serven for their comments and help with the data, and
seminar participants at the NBER’s International Differences in Entrepreneurship Conference, the
European University Institute, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and North-
eastern University for their many suggestions. We also thank David Raines for his excellent research
assistance; any errors are our responsibility.
1higher unemployment in Continental Europe than in the United States. Deregula-
tion has been highly recommended to countries like Italy, France, and Germany, as
well as to developing nations, to improve their economies.
One way in which the regulatory and legal environment can impact growth
and employment is its effect on the rate at which new businesses are created. In
fact, as suggested by the Schumpeterian approach to economic growth (Aghion
and Howitt 1997), new entrepreneurial activities play a vital part in the process
of creative destruction that fosters innovation, employment, and growth. While a
burgeoning empirical literature has studied the inﬂuence of regulation of product
and labor markets on GDP growth, TFP, investment, and employment using macro
data,1 little is known about how a country’s regulatory and legal environment affect
individuals’ decisions to engage in new entrepreneurial activity.
In our paper, we tackle this question using micro data. We study the effect of
regulation on entrepreneurship in a broad sample of countries using a novel data
set: the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). There are several advantages
in using data from GEM. First, we can rely on cross-national harmonized data
on entrepreneurship for about 150,000 individuals in thirty-seven developed and
developing nations. This is the only dataset that allows researchers to compare
the level of business creation and its determinants at the micro level across many
countries. Second, we can identify two different types of entrepreneurs: those who
enter entrepreneurship to pursue a business opportunity and those whose entrepre-
neurial activity is simply remedial, i.e., they could not ﬁnd a better alternative.
This distinction is important in that it allows us to perform an economic analysis
of entrepreneurship that has not been possible in previous work. Third, we have
information on a wide-ranging set of individual characteristics, including business
skills, fear of failure, and social networks. Thus, we can account for a good set
of determinants of entrepreneurship across countries. To be able to examine the
impact of regulation on entrepreneurial activity, we merge data from GEM with
data on measures of regulation in the product markets, the labor markets, and the
legal system.
There are relatively few studies that investigate the factors affecting individual
decisions to engage in new entrepreneurial activity in a broad sample of countries;
most of the literature uses micro data from one particular country, the United States
in the majority of the cases. Also, with the exception of Djankov et al. (2005),
(2006a), (2006b), and (2008), who investigate the role of a broad set of macro
and micro variables on entrepreneurship in Russia, China, and Brazil, empirical
1A non-exhaustive list of papers includes: Alesina et al. (2005), Bassanini and Ernst (2002),
Bayoumi et al. (2004), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Fiori et al. (2007), Loayza et al. (2004),
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
2research has focused on a limited number of individual characteristics.2 Moreover,
while the literature has focused on tax policy and liquidity constraints (see, for ex-
ample, the work by Djankov et al. (2007), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), Guiso et al. (2004), Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and (2008)),3 our
paper looks at other types of regulation, such as the regulation of product and labor
market and contract enforcement. In this respect, our paper relates to the work
of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006), Desai et al. (2003), Klapper et al. (2006),
and Guiso and Schivardi (2006), who investigate the role of regulation in product
markets on industries’ entry rates and on several other ﬁrms’ characteristics using
ﬁrms’ level data from developed and transitional countries.
Views about regulation vary widely in economic theory. According to public
choice theory, regulation is socially inefﬁcient and exists either because industry
incumbentsareabletolobbygovernment ofﬁcialstopasslawsthat grantthemrents
or because politicians use regulation to extract rents for their own beneﬁt. Hence,
regulation is a burden for new and existing ﬁrms. The public interest theory of reg-
ulationproposesan opposing view: regulation exists to curemarket failures; hence,
heavier regulation should lead to socially superior outcomes.4 More generally, reg-
ulation can foster or hinder entrepreneurial activity depending on the dimension of
regulation one considers. In our empirical work, we consider three broad areas of
regulation: regulation of entry, regulation of contract enforcement, and regulation
of labor. For each area, we can envision channels through which regulation af-
fects entrepreneurship in potentially opposite directions. For example, as Ciccone
and Papaioannou (2006) show, entry regulation can delay the introduction of new
product varieties in industries that experience expansionary global demand or tech-
nology shocks. Hence, the rate at which ﬁrms enter these particular industries is
lower in countries that regulate entry more extensively. Second, credit constraints
can bind a larger fraction of would-be entrepreneurs in countries where it is more
expensive to comply with entry regulation. As a result, individuals who would like
to start a new business are prevented from doing so by credit constraints. This is
more likely to occur in less ﬁnancially developed countries.5 Finally, as Klapper et
al. (2006) discuss, entry regulation that protects investors enhances access to credit
2See, for example, the papers by Blanchﬂower ((2000) and (2004)), Blanchﬂower, Oswald, and
Stutzer (2001), and Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998), and the review in Hurst and Lusardi (2004)
and (2008).
3See also Alfaro and Charlton (2007) for the effects of international ﬁnancial integration on en-
trepreneurship.
4See Djankov et al. (2002) for an extensive review of the theory of regulation.
5See Banerjee and Newman (1994), and Desai et al. (2003) for the relation between entry costs,
ﬁnancial constraints, and entrepreneurship. See also the work by Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998),
Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and
(2008) for an overview of the importance and empirical relevance of liquidity constraints.
3for would-be entrepreneurs. In this case, entry regulation increases entry rates
and facilitates entrepreneurship. Similarly, both contract enforcement regulation,
which affects the efﬁciency and the functioning of the legal system, and the regula-
tion of labor markets can have opposite effects on the individual decision to start a
new business (see, for example, Djankov et al. (2003), Desai et al. (2003), La Porta
et al. (1998) and (2000)). Thus, whether regulation has a beneﬁcial or detrimental
effect on entrepreneurship is ultimately an empirical question; the speciﬁc goal of
our empirical work is to understand whether entrepreneurship ﬂourishes in more
or in less regulated environments.
Consistent with the public choice model, we ﬁnd that regulation acts as a detri-
ment to entrepreneurship, particularly for those individuals who become entrepre-
neurs to pursue a business opportunity. In our empirical analysis, we estimate
the effect of regulation via its impact on individual characteristics. Regulation
has the greatest impact on the effects of social network, business skills, attitudes
toward risk, and working status. Speciﬁcally, regulation attenuates the effect of
social networks, business skills, and working status on entrepreneurship while it
strengthens the impact of attitudes toward risk. We ﬁnd also that several indi-
vidual characteristics—gender, age, and education—are important determinants of
entrepreneurship, though their effects differ across types of entrepreneurship. For
example, the estimates of education are positive and statistically signiﬁcant for in-
dividuals who become entrepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity, while they
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant for those whose entrepreneurial activity is
simply remedial. This ﬁnding further highlights the importance of being able to
distinguish between types of entrepreneurs. Finally, we provide ample evidence
that our ﬁndings are robust to a variety of extensions and robustness checks. In
particular, our results are virtually unchanged when we instrument countries’ reg-
ulatory indicators with countries’ legal origins to account for the potential endo-
geneity of regulation.
The GEM data can provide very useful information to policy-makers. In par-
ticular, the data can speak to the determinants of entrepreneurship across countries.
Most importantly, the data showthere are different types of entrepreneurs and these
differences should be taken into account when evaluating the effects of policies to-
ward entrepreneurship.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and presents
some descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and our
results. The last section concludes.
42D a t a
This section describes the data we employ in the empirical analysis. We begin by
discussing the micro survey data. In section 2.2 we illustrate the institutional and
regulatory data, and in section 2.3 we show descriptive statistics on the relationship
among entrepreneurship, personal characteristics (such as age, sex, and education),
and countries’ regulatory environments. We then perform an econometric analysis
of the effect of regulation on different measures of entrepreneurship and several
robustness checks.
2.1 GEM micro survey data
WeusemicrosurveydatacollectedbytheGlobalEntrepreneurshipMonitor(GEM),
aresearchprogramstartedin1998thatannuallycollectscross-nationalharmonized
data on entrepreneurship. Each year the project surveys (i) either by phone or face-
to-face interviews a sample of at least 2,000 randomly selected individuals in each
country (the Adult Population Survey), and (ii) an average of 35 national experts
in each country, using face-to-face interviews and self-administered questionnaires
(Expert Questionnaire Data). A coordination team at London Business School su-
pervises the contracts to survey vendors, receives the data, checks all data ﬁles for
inconsistencies, harmonizes the entire dataset, and generates new variables.6
In this paper, we use data from the Adult Population Surveys of 2001 and
2002. These are the most recent surveys available to researchers who are not di-
rectly involved in the GEM project and include information both on individuals’
decisions to engage in entrepreneurial activity and on individuals’ motivations to
start a new business. One advantage of using these data is also that the deﬁni-
tions of variables and the methodology used in collecting the data are consistent
between the two years. Countries included in our sample are: Argentina, Aus-
t r a l i a ,B e l g i u m ,B r a z i l ,C a n a d a ,C h i l e ,C h i n a ,C r o a t i a ,D e n m a r k ,F i n l a n d ,F r a n c e ,
Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mex-
ico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, United
Kingdom, and United States.7 We restrict our analysis to individuals of 18-64
years of age and the total number of observations in our sample is 152,612.8
6See Reynolds et al. (2005) for more information on the GEM project and the data collection
process.
7Adult Population Surveys have been conducted also in Iceland in 2001 and 2002. We exclude
Iceland from our sample because regulatory variables for most of the indices we use are not available
for this country. Including Iceland in the regressions in which we exclude the regulatory variables
does not change the main results.
8In our empirical work, we always use weights. However, the difference between weighted and
52.1.1 Measuresofentrepreneurialactivityandindividualcharacteristicsdata
Our variable of interest is total entrepreneurial activity (TEA), which can be fur-
ther split into total opportunity entrepreneurial activity (TEAOPP)a n dt o t a lr e -
medial entrepreneurial activity (TEANEC). TEAis an indicator variable equal
to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a
young ﬁrm; it is equal to zero otherwise. TEAOPPis an indicator variable equal
to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of
a young ﬁrm to take advantage of a business opportunity; it is equal to zero oth-
erwise (opportunity entrepreneurs hereafter). TEANEC is an indicator variable
equal to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers
of a young ﬁrm because they could ﬁnd no better economic work; it is equal to
zero otherwise (remedial or necessity entrepreneurs hereafter).9
Individuals starting a new business are individuals who (i) alone or with others
are currently trying to start a new business, including any type of self-employment,
or (ii) alone or with others are trying to start a new business or a new venture to-
gether with their employer as an effort that is part of their normal work, and who
(a) have been active in the past 12 months in trying to start the new business, (b)
expect to own part of it, and (c) have not paid salaries and wages to anybody, in-
cluding the owner/managers, for more than 3 months. Individuals who are owners
and managers of a young ﬁrm are individuals who, alone or with others, are the
owners of a company they help manage, provided that the company has been pay-
ing salaries and wages for no more than 42 months.10 Thus, our focus is on ﬁrms
at the initial planning or inception stage. Our data represents the potential supply
of entrepreneurs rather than the actual rate of entrepreneurship.11 This is a speciﬁc
deﬁnition of entrepreneur that differs from what other papers have used so far (see,
for example, Blanchﬂower (2004), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Hurst and Lusardi
(2004), Gentry and Hubbard (2000)), but, as explained below, it is appropriate
given the focus of this paper.
These data present several advantages. First, we can concentrate on the start-up
p h a s ea n do nt h eﬁrst few years of a new business, rather than on well-established
ﬁrms that have been active for many years and for which, for example, the regula-
unweighted statistics and weighted and unweighted empirical estimates is rather small. Results using
the unweighted data are available upon request.
9We will use the terms remedial entrepreneurs and necessity entrepreneurs interchangeably.
10Appendix II reports the survey questions that the GEM coordination team uses to generate the
variables TEA, TEAOPP, TEANEC. The exact methodology is based on procedures previously
used in the US Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics and it is described in detail in the 2001 and
2002 Adult Population Surveys’ data documentation and in Reynolds et al. (2005).
11One reason to consider the nascent and the early-stage entrepreneurs together is that the size of
these two groups can be quite small, particularly among European countries.
6tory environment can have different effects. Second, we can distinguish between
different types of entrepreneurs, i.e., those individuals involved in entrepreneur-
ship to take advantage of a business opportunity as opposed to those individuals
for whom entrepreneurship is a remedial activity. This distinction is not available
in many previous studies on entrepreneurship, but it can be particularly useful in
studying the impact of individual characteristics and countries’ institutional and
regulatory differences on the creation of new businesses. Moreover, it is useful in
studying the effects of policies toward entrepreneurship.
Table 1 reports the number of observations for each country in the sample
(column 1); the mean and standard deviation of the variables TEA , TEAOPP,
TEANEC (columns 2-7); and the ratio of the variables TEANEC/TEAOPP
(column 8) for all countries in our sample and for different groups of countries.
We group countries by income groups and by geographic regions using the World
Bank classiﬁcation, and by legal origins following the classiﬁcation in Djankov et
al. (2003). We also compute statistics for countries belonging to the European
Union.12 On average, in the entire sample, the percentage of individuals partic-
ipating in entrepreneurial activity is 7.6%. Among them about 36% start a new
business or are managers/owners of a young ﬁrm because other employment op-
tions are not available or not appealing, while the rest participate in entrepreneurial
activitiesto exploit aperceivedbusinessopportunity. Theaverageentrepreneurship
rate is much higher in low- and middle-low income countries than in high-income
countries; with rates of about 14% and 6.7% respectively. However, the type of
entrepreneurial activities undertaken in these countries is rather different: in poor
countries more than two thirds of individuals engage in remedial entrepreneurial
activities, while this type of entrepreneurship drops to 21.9% in high-income coun-
tries (see also ﬁgure 1). Total entrepreneurial activity is highest in Latin America
(14.10%), followed by countries in the East Asia and Paciﬁcr e g i o n( 9 . 4 % ) ,w h i l e
countries belonging to the European Union (EU) have the lowest rate of entrepre-
neurial activity (5.68%). However, as shown in Figure 1, the ratio of remedial
to opportunity entrepreneurial activity is much higher in Latin American than in
the Organisation for Economics Co-operation and Development (OECD) and EU
countries.
Entrepreneurial activity also varies with a nation’s legal origin. While in coun-
12The World Bank classiﬁes economies in income groups using the gross national income per
capita, calculated with the World Bank Atlas method. The most recent classiﬁcation uses data for
2005, (see www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /classgroups.htm). The groups are: low income,
$875 or less; lower middle-income, $876-3,465; upper middle-income $3,466-10,725; and high in-
come, $10,726 or more. Low and middle income economies are also classiﬁed by geographical
regions. We augmented this classiﬁcation by including in the various groups the high income coun-
tries. See Appendix I for the exact classiﬁcation of countries in each group.
7tries with English (common law) legal origin and in countries with French (civil
law) legal origin, the percentage of individuals engaging in any type of entrepre-
neurial activity is almost identical (8.24% and 8.36%, respectively), individual mo-
tivation to start a new business or to be the manager/owner of a young ﬁrm varies.
On average, 6.04% of people become entrepreneurs to take advantage of a business
opportunity in countries with English legal origin, while 5.27% do so in countries
with French legal origin, and the respective ratio TEANEC/TEAOPP goes
from 28.8% to 50.3%.
Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation of the regressors we use in the
empirical analysis in all countries in the sample (column 1), in low-income (col-
umn 2), middle-low-income (column 3), upper-middle-income (column 4), and
high-income countries (column 5). We use a variety of demographic variables that
a r ea l s ou s e di nm a n yo t h e rs t u d i e s :a g e ,g ender, education, working status, and
income. Moreover, we use other less used, but potentially important variables to
explain entrepreneurship: self-assessed business skills, attitudes toward risk, and
social networks.13 Wemeasureself-assessedbusinessskills(Skills)w it had u mm y
variable equal to 1 if an individual answers that he or she has the knowledge, skill,
and experience to start a new business; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise. Fear
of failure, a proxy for individual attitudes toward risk, is measured by the dummy
variable Fearfail, which is equal to 1 for individual sw h oa n s w e rt h a tf e a ro ff a i l -
ing prevents them from starting a newbusiness; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise.
Finally, we measure social netw o r k sw i t ht h ed u m m yv a r i a b l eKnowent,w h i c hi s
equal to 1 if an individual knows someone who has started a business in the past
two years; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise. Although we are aware that these
variables may not be truly exogenous with respect to the choice of starting a new
business, they can be critical indicators of the impediments or the stimulators of
business creation and they can help explain the wide heterogeneity we see among
business owners. In this paper, given our focus on regulation, we will not account
for the potential endogeneity of these variables. Appendix I includes the precise
deﬁnition of all the variables. There are substantial differences in these variables
among the countries. For example, the proportion of individuals that are not work-
ing is substantially higher in low income countries than in higher income countries.
Similarly, the fraction of individuals with a college degree is much smaller in low
income countries than in other countries. Moreover, both social networks and fear
of failure are much lower in low income countries than in other countries. These
statistics already point to potentially different types of entrepreneurship among
countries depending on the income level of each country.
13Other papers that have used these types of variables include de Melo, McKenzie and Woodruff
(2008), and Djankov et al (2008).
82.1.2 Reliability of GEM data
GEM data have not been used extensively by academics yet and not much is known
about these data. Therefore, before describing our empirical work, we provide an
overview of the quality of the data. First, we compare the GEM data with data from
other surveys and we review the comparisons of GEM data performed by other
researchers (Reynolds et al. (2005) and Acs et al. (2007)). Second, throughout
the paper we show that the descriptive statistics on entrepreneurship in many of the
countries covered by GEM are consistent with the results reported in other studies
on entrepreneurship. Third, for both the descriptive statistics and the econometric
analysis, we check the robustness of our results across countries and/or groups of
countries and across survey years.
One data set that reports information similar to GEM is the Flash Eurobarom-
eter Survey on Entrepreneurship collected by the European Commission.14 While
not all countries covered in GEM are available in the Flash Eurobarometer, we can
compare data among the countries common to both data sets, given that questions
are rather similar between the two surveys. Table 3 shows results for individuals
living in countries that are surveyed both in GEM in 2001 and/or 2002 (column
1) and in the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys in 2002, 2003, and/or 2004 (column
2).15 For each variable, we report the mean, its standard error, and the number of
observations. The percentage of individuals involved in entrepreneurial activity is
very similar in the two datasets (6.37% when we use GEM data and 6.53% when
we use data from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Entrepreneurship), regard-
less of the signiﬁcantly smaller sample surveyed by the European Commission,
which is about one third the size of the GEM sample. The percentage of individ-
uals pursuing a business opportunity is equal to 4.93% in column 1 and 4.12% in
column 2, while the percentage of individuals for whom entrepreneurship is a re-
medial activity is lower in the GEM dataset (1.06% in column 1) than in the Flash
Eurobarometer Survey data (1.35% in column 2). Note, however, that the sample
size shrinks further in column 2 because information on individual motivation to
participate in entrepreneurship is available only in the 2004 data collected by the
European Commission.
We can also compare demographic characteristics, such as age, the percentage
of males, the percentage of individuals who work, and the percentage of individu-
als who think that fear of failing could prevent them from starting a new business.
14See Appendix III for a description of the variables computed using data from the Flash Euro-
barometer Surveys.
15Countries surveyed in both databases are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
9Results in Table 3 are very similar regardless of the dataset used for these variables
both when we look at the entire sample and when we average the characteristics
among individuals who participate in entrepreneurial activities and among those
who do not. The only exception is the variable measuring the percentage of indi-
viduals who think that fear of failing could prevent them from starting a new busi-
ness. The average value is higher when we use data from the Flash Eurobarometer
Surveys (44.99%) than when we use GEM data (34.85%). However, the difference
between the percentage of individuals who think that fear of failing could prevent
them from starting a new business and are not entrepreneurs and those with the
same beliefs but who are involved in an entrepreneurial activity is much closer in
thetwodatasets: usingGEMdata, thisdifferenceisequal to16.05%(35.89-19.84);
using data from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys it is equal to 11.2%.
Reynolds et al. (2005) compare GEM national annual new ﬁrms’ estimates
and new ﬁrms’ birth rates with data from the Ofﬁcial New Firm Census and data
from the European Commission Report. They show that the TEAindex and other
entrepreneurship indices computed using GEM data are reliable and capture the
creation of new ﬁrms on a scale comparable to that resulting from the use of other
national administrative datasets.
Finally, Acs et al. (2007) compare the GEM data with the World Bank Group
Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) dataset, which collected data on formal busi-
nessregistrationsoflimitedliabilitycorporations(LLCs)in84countriesfrom2003
to 2005. Speciﬁcally, Acs et al. (2007) consider separately the two components of
the TEAindex deﬁned above (i.e., they distinguish individuals who are starting a
newbusiness—nascententrepreneurs—fromindividualswhoareownersandman-
agers of a young ﬁrm—baby entrepreneurs) and calculate the spread between the
nascent and baby entrepreneurship rates in GEM (deﬁned as the proportion of the
adult population in each country who engages in nascent or baby entrepreneurship)
and the percentage of individuals who have started a formal corporation. The au-
thors report a number of differences in the two datasets: (i) GEM data show higher
levels of early-stage entrepreneurship in developing economies than WBGES data;
(ii) WBGES business entry data tend to be higher than GEM data for developed
countries; (iii) a signiﬁcantly negative relationship is found between administrative
barriers to starting abusiness and entrepreneurship when WBGES data areusedbut
not when GEM data are used. Several explanations are given for such differences,
which, in our view, are very important in clarifying the differences among the two
datasets, but in no way suggest that one dataset is of better quality than the other.
First, Acs et al. (2007) point out that, while WBGES only considers businesses
that legally registered as limited liability corporations, GEM data consider a larger
set of entrepreneurial activities: from businesses that operate in the formal sector
but opt for a different legal status than an LLC, to businesses that can be part of
10the informal economy, to entrepreneurial initiatives that are at the very early stage
and, hence, can potentially become businesses operating in the formal sector but
do not yet actually do so. Such a range of possibilities is likely to be more relevant
for developing than developed countries given the extent of the informal sector.
Second, GEM measures the number of individual entrepreneurs, while WBGES
considers the number of businesses. Hence, GEM can overlook the number of
individuals who are involved in multiple new businesses. Third, the deﬁnition of
baby entrepreneurs in GEM considers data for 42 months of activity, not for 12
months, but when one estimates the annual rate for the United States they are of
comparable magnitude of those recorded by the U.S. Census. Fourth, especially
in developed countries, ﬁrms may register several limited liability corporations to
limit liability for different lines of businesses, helping to explain why for some
countries entrepreneurship rates computed using the World Bank data are higher
than rates computed with GEM data.
We would like to offer an additional explanation. GEM data allow a distinc-
tion between remedial and opportunity entrepreneurship. As we have discussed in
section 2.1.1, remedial entrepreneurship is more widespread in developing than in
developed countries, and remedial entrepreneurs are less likely to register a busi-
ness as an LLC. This can offer another reason for higher entrepreneurship rates
in developing countries when rates are computed using GEM rather than WBGES
data. Finally, relative to the existence of a negative relationship between entry bar-
riers and entrepreneurship rates, results below show that a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant relationship can be found when one uses data from GEM. However, it
is important to consider opportunity and remedial entrepreneurship separately (see
section 2.3), and/or to estimate the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship using
micro rather than macro data. This allows researchers to control for other pos-
sible institutional and policy differences that exist among various developed and
developing countries (see section 3).
To further examine the quality of the data, we have estimated the probability
of starting a business as a function of a set of demographic characteristics that are
available in the data (age, gender, employment status, education, income, etc.),
country by country. For the subset of countries for which we have data in both
2001 and 2002, we also performed regressions by country and by year. For brevity,
in Table 4 we report results for only six countries: the United States, two upper-
income countries —Canada and Italy; two middle-low-income countries—Brazil
and China; and India, the only country in our sample classiﬁed in the low-income
group. Results for the other countries in our sample are not reported but are avail-
able upon request. We have ﬁrst compared the estimates using GEM data for the
United States with estimates from other studies on entrepreneurship (see Lusardi
and Hurst (2008)). Estimates are very similar for the United States, particularly re-
11garding demographic variables such as gender and education. Estimates for other
countries are similar to results reported by Djankov et al. (2008) for Brazil and
Djankov et al. (2006a) for China, particularly for variables such as social networks
and attitudes toward risk. The importance of social networks in Italy is also high-
lighted in the work by Guiso and Schivardi (2006). Among the countries whose
results are not reported, three countries: Russia, Poland, and Slovenia, display re-
sults that are different than other countries but, as reported in the robustness check
at the end of this paper, the inclusion or exclusion of these countries does not af-
fect our main estimates. France also displays different estimates between 2001 and
2002, although we cannot exclude the possibility that they are genuine changes due
to differences in macroeconomic conditions between the two years.
2.2 Regulatory data
To perform our empirical work, we merge the micro survey data described above
with data on countries’ institutional and regulatory environments. We follow the
work of Loayza et al. (2004), and construct indices on several aspects of market
regulation.16 In particular, we focus on entry regulatory indicators for the product
markets, regulation of contract enforcement (indicators measuring the efﬁciency of
the justice system in resolving legal disputes), and labor market regulation. While
these aspects of regulation do not cover all regulatory and economic policies (e.g.,
taxes, tariff and non-tariff barriers, safety and environmental standards) that can
inﬂuence individual entrepreneurial behavior, they include some of the most im-
portant regulatory constraints across countries.
The data we use are from the following sources: Doing Business Database
(the World Bank Group), Index of Economic Freedom (the Heritage Foundation),
International Country Risk Guide (the PRS Group), and Djankov et al. (2004).
Data from Doing Business refer to the year 2003; data from Djankov et al. (2004)
refer to the year 1997; all other data are averages of all the available data points
until the year 2000. Appendix I lists the exact source, time period, and deﬁnition
of each regulatory variable used in the empirical analysis.
Because our indices of regulation combine several different variables, we stan-






when lower values of the variable X indicate heavier regulation. Hence, each stan-
dardized regulatory variable is simply anindex ranging from 0 to 1, increasing with
16We construct our own indices, rather than using the ones provided to us by Loayza et al. (2004),
because regulatory variables for eleven countries included in our sample are not available in Loayza
et al. (2004).
12the amount of regulation. For each area of regulation, we construct a synthetic in-
dicator of the tightness of regulation. Each synthetic indicator is the average of
the standardized indices measuring regulation of the relevant area. The indices are
described below.
Entry: The entry index measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face
when they decide to create a new business. It is the average of the number of
procedures that are ofﬁcially required to start and operate a new business, the time
and cost needed to complete such procedures, and a composite index measuring
not only how easy/difﬁcult it is to operate a business but also the degree of cor-
ruption in the government and whether or not regulation is applied uniformly to all
businesses.
Contract: The contract enforcement index is an indicator that measures the
efﬁciency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes. It is the average
of the number of procedures required to solve a dispute and of an index measuring
the ability of the government to operate without dramatic changes in policy or
interruptions of its services.
Labor: The labor index measures the difﬁculty for entrepreneurs of adjusting
the labor force. It is the average of indices measuring the difﬁculty in hiring and
ﬁring workers, the rigidity of labor contracts, and the percentage of the workforce
afﬁliated with labor unions.
These indices are those used by Loyaza et al. (2004) although for a larger set
of countries. Use of these indices allows us to compare our results to previous
studies and to capture many different aspects of regulation in the three areas we
consider. However, we also perform a set of regressions to examine the effect of
each individual component. We report the results in section 3.6.
Table 5 reports the value of the synthetic indices of regulation for all countries
in the total sample and for groups of countries. Several features are worth noting.
First, the level of regulation is negatively related to the countries’ income: coun-
tries in the low- and middle-low-income groups exhibit levels of regulation that
are up to three times higher than the level of regulation in high-income countries.
The ranking among groups of countries is quite similar for the entry and contract
enforcement indices. The index measuring the regulation of labor shows that coun-
tries in the East Asia and Paciﬁc region have the lowest level of regulation, while
the level of regulation in OECD countries, and, in particular, in countries belonging
to the European Union, is very close to that of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and
Central Asia. Second, consistent with the results of several other papers,17 when
17A non-exhaustive list of papers relating countries’ legal origins and their regulatory environment
includes Djankov et al. (2002), Djankov et al. (2003), Djankov et al. (2004), and Klapper et al.
(2006).
13we group countries by their legal origin, countries with English legal origin are
among those with the lowest levels of regulation, while countries with French and
Socialist legal origin are among those with the highest levels of regulation.
Table 6 shows the correlation among the regulatory indices. There is a strong
positive correlation between the Entry and Contract indices, while the correla-
tion of these two indices and the Labor index is lower. When we further look at
the correlation among the components of each synthetic index, in all areas but the
labor market, we ﬁnd a positive correlation that ranges from a minimum of 38% to
a maximum of 70%. However, for the labor market index, we observe a very low
correlation between indicators of hiring and ﬁring costs and union density, and, in
one case, the correlation is negative. Thus, regulation in the labor markets can have
different effects than regulation in other markets.
Finally, given that we have a different sample, we computed the correlation of
the indices we constructed with the ones of Loyaza et al. (2004). The correlation
is equal to 0.97 for the entry regulatory index, 0.80 for the contract enforcement
regulation index, and 0.74 for the labor market regulation index. Hence, even
thoughoursampleofcountriesdiffersfromthat ofLoyazaetal. (2004), ourindices
are very similar.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
We start the empirical analysis with some descriptive statistics. We ﬁrst discuss the
relationship between entrepreneurship and personal characteristics (Table 7); we
then turn to the relationship between entrepreneurship and countries’ regulatory
environments.
In Table 7, columns 1-3, we compute average values of the individual char-
acteristics described in Table 2 separately for individuals who engage in entrepre-
neurial activity (TEA= 1) and for those who do not (TEA= 0). We also test for
the equality of means between entrepreneur types. Even though we only consider
individuals in pre-retirement years (ages 18-64), the average age of entrepreneurs
is lower by approximately 2 years than the average age of non-entrepreneurs (i.e.,
individuals who are not operating a new or young ﬁrm) and the difference is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The percentage of males among entrepreneurs
is higher than among non-entrepreneurs as is the percentage of working individu-
als (85% of nascent entrepreneurs are working at the time of the interview, while
only 64.8% of non-entrepreneurs are working). As far as individual education is
concerned, the largest difference relates to the percentage of people holding a post-
secondary degree—about 8% greater in the sample of entrepreneurs. Similarly, the
percentage of high-income people starting a new business is 9% greater than that
of people in the same income category who are not engaging in entrepreneurial
14activity. Finally, the percentage of individuals who know someone who has started
a business in the recent past and the percentage of individuals who think that they
have the knowledge, skills, and experience to start a new business is signiﬁcantly
higher among entrepreneurs than among non-entrepreneurs. The opposite occurs
for the percentage of individuals who think that fear of failing could prevent them
from starting a new business. Note that in all cases, we can reject the null hypoth-
esis of the test on the equality of the means of the two groups of individuals at the
5% level of signiﬁcance.
We have conducted the same type of analysis comparing characteristics of dif-
ferent types of entrepreneurs. Results are reported in Table 7, columns 4-6. On
average, opportunity entrepreneurs are slightly younger than remedial entrepre-
neurs. Moreover, opportunity entrepreneurs are more likely to be male, to have a
higher level of education and income, and to have more conﬁdence in their skills
and abilities and less fear of failure than remedial entrepreneurs. Consistent with
the test results in Table 7, columns 1-3, we can reject the null hypothesis of the
equality of means in the two groups of individuals for almost all variables. For ex-
ample, means are statistically different between the two groups for variables such
as the percentage of people who work, the percentage of people with more than a
college degree, and with low and high (but not middle) income.
Finally, we have repeated the analysis in Table 7, dividing countries by income
groups and geographical areas. Results, not shown but available upon request, are
qualitatively identical to those just discussed.
Wenowturntoacross-countryanalysisofentrepreneurshipandregulation. We
compute the proportion of opportunity entrepreneurs (TEAOPP) and remedial
entrepreneurs (TEANEC) for each country in our sample and study the univari-
ate relationship between the proportion of entrepreneurs in each country and the
level of regulation, using the three indices we discussed in section 2.2. Figures 2
and3showtheresultsforthegroupofhigh-incomecountriesand middle-andlow-
income countries respectively. We ﬁnd a negative relationship between TEAOPP
and allmeasuresofregulation. Thus, higherlevelsofregulation areassociatedwith
lower rates of activity to pursue a business opportunity. This is true both in the
high-income country group and in the low and middle-income group, even though
the magnitude of the effects differs in the two groups of countries. Findings are
different for the other measure of entrepreneurial activity: TEANEC.W eﬁnd
a positive correlation between the indices of entry regulation and of contract en-
forcement regulation and TEANEC, but a negative correlation between the level
of regulation of labor markets and TEANEC. Thus, countries with more stringent
regulation of entry, less efﬁcient judicial systems, and less regulated labor markets
exhibit higher remedial entrepreneurship rates. However, due to the small number
of observations at the macro level (25 for the high-income group, and 12 for low,
15middle-low and upper-middle-income countries), the coefﬁcients of the univariate
regressions are often not statistically signiﬁcant. This analysis shows that it is criti-
cally important to be able to differentiate between types of entrepreneurial activity.
It also highlights that regulation may act as a detriment for the type of entrepre-
neurial activity —opportunity entrepreneurs—that is more likely to be a drive for
economic activity and growth.
3 Econometric analysis
3.1 Methodology
We now turn to a more formal analysis of the effect of individual characteristics
and regulation on entrepreneurship. For individual i, in country j,a tt i m et,l e t
us deﬁne the outcome of interest yijt,w h e r ey is one of the three measures of en-
trepreneurial activity: TEA, TEAOPP, TEANEC.W ee s t i m a t et h ef o l l o w i n g
equation for yijt:
yijt = α j + β1Xijt + β2XijtRj + γ t + εijt (1)
where α j is a vector of country dummies, X is a vector of variables measur-
ing individual characteristics such as age, gender, employment status, education,
income, the role of social networks, business skills, and fear of failure, R captures
countries’ regulatory and legal environment, and γ t i sat i m ed u m m yv a r i a b l e .
Since the dependent variable is binary, we use probit estimation and correct the
standard errors by clustering them at the country level.
Our sample includes many different countries whose macroeconomic and in-
stitutional characteristics (level of economic development, growth rates, level of
taxation, and degree of openness, just to mention a few) can be correlated both with
the entrepreneurship indices and with the regulatory variables. While we cannot
separately account for each country’s macroeconomic and institutional variable,
we can control for countries’ speciﬁc characteristics, including the level of the reg-
ulatory environment, by adding country ﬁxed effects to our regressions. Because
regulatory variables are country and time invariant, once we include α j among our
regressors, we can only measure the differential effect that personal characteristics
have on the decision to engage in entrepreneurial activity because of cross-country
differences in the regulatory and legal environment. In other words, we can only
measure the effect of regulation via the interaction between countries’ regulation
and individual characteristics.
163.2 Entrepreneurship and personal characteristics
In Table 8 we estimate the effect of individual characteristics on the indices of
entrepreneurial activity TEA, TEAOPP, TEANEC. In columns 1-3, we ex-
clude the variables measuring the income group to which the individual belongs.
We include income dummies in columns 4-6. When we do so, the sample shrinks
signiﬁcantly because the income data is not available for many countries.
The variable that has the largest effect on the likelihood of an individual be-
coming an entrepreneur is Skills, a proxy for individual degree of self-conﬁdence
(or self-assessed skills and abilities). Ceteris paribus, when Skills = 1, the prob-
ability of engaging in entrepreneurship increases by more than 8.5% in column 1
when considering TEA. T h ee f f e c t so fSkills is large both for opportunity and
remedial entrepreneurs, estimates are 5.9% in column 2 and 1.5% in column 3,
respectively.
Fear of failure, a proxy for individual attitudes toward risk, is another impor-
tant variable and negatively affects entrepreneurship. Note that fear of failure af-
fects opportunity entrepreneurs and our total index of entrepreneurship, but it is
signiﬁcant only at the 10% level for individuals for whom entrepreneurship is a
remedial activity. Similarly, the effect of education on entrepreneurship depends
on entrepreneurial type. The coefﬁcients of the dummy variables Highschool and
College18 are both positive and statistically signiﬁcant when we estimate equa-
tion (1) for TEAOPP, while both are negative and statistically signiﬁcant for
TEANEC. This may explain why evidence of the effect of education on entrepre-
neurship in the literature is rather mixed when using a measure of entrepreneurship
that does not account for individual motivation to become an entrepreneur (see, for
example, Blanchﬂower (2004)). These ﬁndings again highlight the importance of
distinguishing between types of entrepreneurial activity.19
Entrepreneurship is also affected by social networks. In all speciﬁcations, the
coefﬁcient of this variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The probability of becoming involved in an entrepreneurial activity when knowing
someone who has started a business increases by 3% for opportunity entrepreneurs
and by 0.5% for remedial entrepreneurs. Other authors have found evidence of
the importance of social networks and social capital on entrepreneurship (see, for
18The dummy variable Highschoolis equal to 1 if the individual has at least a high school degree
(high school degree or more than high school but no college degree) and to 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable Collegeis equal to 1 if the individual has at least a college degree (college degree and higher
degrees) and to 0 otherwise.
19As highlighted in Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga (2008) some forms of entrepreneurship are
simply a subsistence activity. Since there is little transition out of this type of business activity
into business-ownership, policy-makers should consider carefully policies that promote remedial
entrepreneurship.
17example, Djankov et al. (2005) and (2006), Guiso et al. (2004) and Nanda and
Sorensen (2007)). Our work adds to this literature by highlighting that networks
are an important factor, particularly for speciﬁc entrepreneurial types.20
Turning to the effect of variables measuring individual status in the workforce,
people who do not work, students, retired and disabled individuals are less likely
to become entrepreneurs than individuals who work. This is true both for remedial
entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs. We also ﬁnd evidence of a nonlinear
effect for age: while the coefﬁcient of the linear term is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, the coefﬁcient of the square term is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant. The magnitude of the coefﬁcients implies that the probability of starting a
new entrepreneurial activity increases with age for individuals younger than 32 in
column 1, younger than 29 in column 2, and younger than 40 in column 3, and
decreases with age afterwards. Finally, men are more likely than women to pursue
entrepreneurial activity; this is true both for necessity and opportunity entrepre-
neurs.
In columns 4-6, we control for the dummy variables Lowestinc, Middleinc,
Upperinc. These indicators are equal to 1 if individuals’ income is in the lowest,
middle, or upper third income percentile of their country’s income distribution,
and equal to 0 otherwise. We ﬁnd a non-linear relationship between the compos-
ite index TEAand individual income. The probability of starting a new business
is higher for individuals in both the lowest and the upper income groups. This
non-linearity captures the different effect income has on entrepreneurial type. For
TEAOPP,t h ec o e f ﬁcient of the variable Lowestinc is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, whilethatofUpperincispositiveandstatisticallysigniﬁcant. For TEANEC,
the coefﬁcient of the variable Lowestinc is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
that of Upperinc is negative and not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, again it is
crucial to be able to distinguish between individual motivations to become entre-
preneurs. Also, while income is an important control, the estimates of the other
variables do not change signiﬁcantly when adding income dummies to the regres-
sion.21 This provides further evidence of the robustness of our estimates since the
sample reduces considerably when adding income dummies.
Thereareotherpotential determinantsofentrepreneurshipthatpreviousstudies
have considered such as wealth, family background, optimism, and other sociolog-
ical and psychological characteristics (see, for example, Blanchﬂower (2004), de
20Estimating the impact of peer effect on entrepreneurship is complex and other studies were able
to take account of the endogeneity of peers (see Nanda and Sorensen (2007) and their discussion
on the difﬁculty of estimating peer effects)). Since we only have a cross section of data, we cannot
address this problem in our empirical analysis.
21The coefﬁcient of the variables Age, Male,a n dHighschool in column 6 become insigniﬁcant.
The coefﬁcient of the variable Fearfail becomes signiﬁcant at the 5% level in column 6.
18Melo, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008), Djankov et al. (2008), Fairlie and Robb
(2007), and Puri and Robinson (2006)). Unfortunately, we do not have information
about these variables in this survey and cannot account for them in our empirical
work.
3.3 Entrepreneurship and regulation
We now consider the effects of regulation by interacting the synthetic indices:
Entry, Contract,a n dLabor with the vector of individual characteristics. Be-
cause indices are highly correlated, we consider each regulatory index separately.
Results are reported in Table 9; they refer to the speciﬁcations in which we exclude
income dummies. We discuss speciﬁcations which include income dummies in
section 3.7.
Columns 1-3 report the results for the regulation of entry. The parameter of
interest is β2. Negative values of β2 in equation (1) indicate that heavier regulation
of entry reduces the effect of personal characteristics on the likelihood to engage
in entrepreneurship when β1 in equation (1) is positive and reinforces the effect of
personal characteristics when β1 is negative. For example, while the probability of
engaging in entrepreneurship is higher for individuals who know someone who has
started a business recently (i.e., those for whom Knowent = 1), in countries where
entry is more heavily regulated, the effect of social network is much reduced. To
evaluate its magnitude, we calculate the marginal effect due to a change in the vari-
able Knowent from 0 to 1 in two hypothetical countries: one in which the entry
regulatory index is equal to 0 (the index minimum value) and one in which the
index is equal to 1 (the index maximum value). Using the estimates reported in
column 1, we ﬁnd that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur in these two
different countries changes from 6% to 1.8%. Thus, regulation substantially curbs
the positive effect of social networks on entrepreneurship. A similar effect also oc-
curs when we distinguish opportunity entrepreneurs from necessity entrepreneurs.
Considerﬁrsttheformer(seecolumn2). Theprobabilitytoengageinentrepreneur-
ship for individuals who know someone who has recently started a new business is
higher by 4 percentage points than for individuals who do not know entrepreneurs
if they live in a low-regulation country (a country in which Entry = 0). How-
ever, individuals who know people who are entrepreneurs have only a 1.7% higher
probability to become entrepreneurs than individuals for whom Knowent = 0i f
they live in a high-regulation country (a country in which Entry = 1). Hence,
the positive effect of social capital on entrepreneurship is reduced by more than
half if Entry changes from 0 to 1. For necessity entrepreneurs (see column 3), the
marginal effect due to a change in the variable Knowent from 0 to 1 is equal to
0.8% when Entry = 0 and it is reduced to 0.2% when Entry = 1. Hence, the
19positive effect of social networks on entrepreneurship is almost eliminated when
going from low- to high-regulation countries (Entry changes from 0 to 1).
Regulation also diminishes the effect of Skills. Individuals who report having
business skills (i.e., those for whom Skills = 1) are less likely to engage in new
entrepreneurial activity when entry regulation is more stringent. This effect is en-
tirely driven by individuals who engage in entrepreneurship to pursue a business
opportunity. In fact, the coefﬁcient of the interaction term Entry ∗ Skills is not
statistically signiﬁcant in column 3, but it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
in column 2.
Tougher entry regulation also decreases the probability of starting new entre-
preneurial activity for individuals who do not work and for students, a ﬁnding that
has important policy implications. Consider, for example, Italy and the United
States, whose values of the entry regulation index are 0.38 and 0.14, respectively.
An American who does not work faces a lower probability of engaging in entre-
preneurship than an American who is employed; the estimate is -1.47% (-0.0058
-(0.064*0.14)). The same ﬁgure is much higher for Italians who do not work; it is
-3.01% (-0.0058 -(0.064*0.38)). Thus, individuals who do not work are two times
less likely to start a new business than individuals who do work if they live in Italy
rather than in the United States. More generally, the average value in the sample of
the index of entry regulation is equal to 0.32 and the standard deviation is equal to
0.17. Thus, individuals who do not work are 2.6% less likely to become entrepre-
neurs than individuals who work. A one standard deviation increase in the index
reduces this number to 3.7%. Finally, individuals who want to pursue a business
opportunity and do not have a job are less likely to engage in entrepreneurship than
individuals who work by 1.7% in countries in which Entry = 0.32. This number
becomes 2% if Entry increases by one standard deviation. For necessity entre-
preneurs who do not have a job, the probability of starting a new business is not
statistically different than for those who work if there are no regulatory constraints
on entry. However, if entry is constrained in their country these entrepreneurs ﬁnd
it more difﬁcult to start a new business.
Our estimatesarein linewith the resultsin Klapper et al. (2006). Theyﬁnd that
relative to the high entry industries in the United States, in highly regulated coun-
tries a lower number of new ﬁrms enter these industries. Ciccone and Papaioannou
(2006) also ﬁnd slower entry in expanding industries in countries where it takes
longer to comply with procedures required to open a new ﬁrm.
Our other indices of regulation show similar results. When we interact per-
sonal characteristics with the Contract index, which measures the efﬁciency of
the judicial system in resolving commercial disputes, we ﬁnd estimates similar to
those reported in column 1 (see columns 4-6). Thus, contract regulation can also
curb the effects of skills, social network, and labor force status. A country’s legal
20environment also plays an important role in individual decisions to engage in en-
trepreneurship, and this is especially true for those individuals who wish to pursue
a business opportunity. The economic magnitude is also relevant. For example,
while the probability of engaging in entrepreneurship is higher for individuals who
know someone who has started a business recently (i.e., those for whom Knowent
= 1), in countries where the legal system is more regulated, the effect of social
networks is much reduced. We calculate again the marginal effect due to a change
in the variable Knowent from 0 to 1 in two hypothetical countries: one in which
the contract regulatory index is equal to 0 (the index minimum value) and one in
which the index is equal to 1 (the index maximum value). Using the estimates
reported in column 4, we ﬁnd that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur
changes by 3.1%. Thus, this different type of regulation also curbs the positive ef-
fect of social networks on entrepreneurship. Using data from Eastern and Western
European ﬁrms, Desai et al. (2003) also ﬁnd that industries’ entry rates are higher
in countries in which courts are fair and impartial, even though this result seems
to be driven by Eastern and Central European countries, not by Western European
ones.
When we investigate the effect of labor market regulation on the determinants
of entrepreneurship (see columns 7-9), we ﬁnd that, as for the other two indices,
labor market regulation curbs the effects of social network. The effect is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for opportunity entrepreneurs, a ﬁnding that can have important
implications for public policy. Moreover, the interaction term Fearfail ∗ Labor
is statistically signiﬁcant for every measure of entrepreneurship we use, while it
was not in the other two indices of regulation. Thus, ceteris paribus, in countries
that heavily regulate the labor market individuals’ risktaking attitudes seem to play
a more important role than in countries with less labor market regulation.22
3.4 Additional robustness checks
Our results are robust to a variety of additional speciﬁcation changes. In what
follows, we discuss several extensions of our models. For brevity, results are not
reported but are available upon request.
First, we interact the components of each synthetic index of regulation with
the vector of individual characteristics. Our goal is to investigate whether a par-
ticular aspect of regulation, in each of the areas we consider, is driving the results
reported in Table 9. For all of the synthetic indicators, we ﬁnd that the compo-
nents of the indices generally have similar effects on entrepreneurship even though
22Our ﬁndings about the negative effects of regulation are consistent with the results by Mul-
lainathan and Schnabl (2008). They examine regulation within one country and show that tighter
regulation hinders entrepreneurship.
21some components have a larger and more signiﬁcant effect through some personal
characteristics’ variables than through others.
Second, weincludeanincomevariable(aggregatedinbroadgroups)amongthe
regressors in Table 9. Our results are, overall, the same. In the regressions in which
we interact the indices of entry and contract enforcement regulation with personal
characteristics we ﬁnd evidence that regulation also has an effect through the age
variable, but the coefﬁcients of the interaction terms between all the regulatory
indices and Skills are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Third, we estimate the speciﬁcations in Table 9 separately for 2001 and 2002
data for the sample of countries for which we have data for both years.23 We ﬁnd
no evidence of relevant changes between regressions for 2001 and 2002 and results
in Table 9.
Fourth, we check that our results do not hinge on data for a particular country.
We exclude one country at a time and reestimate the speciﬁcation used in Table
9. Results are qualitatively the same, even when excluding Russia, Poland, and
Slovenia, whose data may be of poorer quality, as discussed above.
Finally, we estimate equation (1) for subgroups of countries. Speciﬁcally, we
consider the speciﬁcations in Table 9 for high-income countries and the other coun-
tries (i.e., countries with low, middle-low and upper- middle incomecountries). We
ﬁnd a stronger effect of labor regulation in the wealthier countries than in the oth-
ers, but in general, results do not change substantially.
3.5 Instrumental variables estimation
A potential problem of the estimates reported above is that the underlying variables
that may be driving entrepreneurship in a country (e.g., an educational system that
encourages individual responsibility or an extensive welfare system that insulates
against unemployment and health risks) may also be driving the regulatory system
in that country. Thus, the relationship between entrepreneurship and regulation
may simply be the result of these omitted variables. Alternatively, it could be that
the desire to achieve a certain level of entrepreneurship in a country shapes regu-
lation in that country. In other words, the causality may go from entrepreneurship
to regulation rather than the other way around. This problem may be less rele-
vant in our empirical work since we only look at the interaction of regulation with
individual characteristics rather than simply looking at the effect of regulation on
entrepreneurship. In this section, we tackle these problems by using instrumental
variables (IV) estimation.
23Data for Portugal are not available in 2002. Data for Switzerland, Chile, Thailand, China, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, Croatia, and Slovenia are not available in 2001.
22Our instruments need to be correlated with regulation but uncorrelated with
the error term. We use countries’ legal origins as instruments. Several papers
have shown that the current regulatory environments correlate with each country’s
legal tradition; for example, countries with English legal origin are among those
with the lowest level of regulation, while countries with French and Socialist le-
gal origin are more heavily regulated. Because countries’ legal origins have been
transplanted through conquest and colonization that occurred centuries ago, legal
origin is unlikely to be correlated with omitted variables that inﬂuence individuals’
decisions to begin a new entrepreneurial activity in 2001 or 2002.
We follow the existing literature and group countries with English (common
law), French (civil law), Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal origins. We
estimate equation (1) instrumenting the variable R with the indicator variables that
measure countries’ legal origins. Results are reported in Table 10. Note that co-
efﬁcient estimates are included in Table 10, while marginal effects are reported in
all the other tables of the paper; hence, the numbers in the tables are not directly
comparable. The estimates continue to conﬁrm the results reported in Table 9.
Both entry and labor market regulation curbs the effects of social networks. Con-
tract regulation also curbs the effects of social network, primarily for opportunity
entrepreneurs. Moreover, entry and contract regulation strengthens the effects of
risk aversion, thus discouraging entrepreneurship and, in particular, remedial en-
trepreneurship. Finally, note that for the speciﬁcations for TEAand TEAOPP,
the p-value of a Wald test on the exogeneity of the regressors does not reject ex-
ogeneity. Thus, our estimates in Table 9 do not seem to be biased due a potential
endogeneity problem.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we use GEM data from thirty-seven countries to estimate the dif-
ferential effect that individual characteristics, such as work status, education, and
attitudes toward risk, have on entrepreneurship because of cross-country differ-
ences in regulatory constraints. Using our data set, we can distinguish between
different types of entrepreneurs, i.e., those who enter entrepreneurship to pursue a
business opportunity versus those who enter entrepreneurship because they could
not ﬁnd better work. We also use different measures of regulation, from measures
of regulation in the product markets to regulation in the labor markets and the legal
system.
We ﬁnd evidence that regulation plays a critical role in the individual decision
to start a new business, particularly for individuals who engage in an entrepreneur-
ial activity to pursue a business opportunity. The variables through which regu-
23lation affects entrepreneurship are social network, working status, business skills,
and attitudes toward risk. Speciﬁcally, regulation curbs the effects of social net-
works and business skills while strengthens the effects of risk aversion. Moreover,
those who do not work are less likely to become entrepreneurs in countries with
high levels of regulation. Our results are robust to a variety of robustness checks.
This is one of the few studies that perform a micro analysis of the determinants
of entrepreneurship and the effect of regulation in a large cross section of countries.
While our approach does not allow us to measure the total effect of regulation,
we can measure the effect of regulation on individual characteristics, which has
important implications for public policy.
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28Appendix I: Variables used in the empirical analysis
Entrepreneurship indices - source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)
• TEA= 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and man-
agers of a young ﬁrm, 0 otherwise.
• TEAOPP= 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and
managers of a young ﬁrm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0
otherwise.
• TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and
managers of a young ﬁrm because they could ﬁnd no better economic work,
0 otherwise.
Individuals’characteristics-source: GlobalEntrepreneurshipMonitor(GEM)
• AGE = age of the individual at the time of the interview.
• MALE= 1 if male, 0 otherwise.
• WORKING= 1 if individual works at the time of the interview, 0 other-
wise.
• STUDENTS = 1 if individual is a student at the time of the interview, 0
otherwise.
• RETIRED DISABLES= 1 if individual is retired or disabled at the time
of the interview, 0 otherwise.
• NOTWORKING = 1 if individual does not work (and he/she is not a
student, nor a retired or disabled individual) at the time of the interview, 0
otherwise.
• HIGHSCHOOL= 1 if individual has a high school degree, 0 otherwise.
• COLLEGE= 1 if individual has at least a college degree, 0 otherwise.
• KNOWENT = 1 if the person knows someone who has started a business
in the recent past, 0 otherwise.
• SKILLS= 1 if the person thinks she has the knowledge, skills, and experi-
ence to start a new business, 0 otherwise.
29• FEARFAIL= 1 if the person’s fear of failing can prevent him or her from
starting a new business, 0 otherwise.
• LOWESTINC = 1 if individuals’ income is in the lowest 33rd income
percentile of their country’s income distribution, 0 otherwise.
• UPPERINC= 1 if individuals’ income is in the upper 33rd income per-
centile of their country’s income distribution, 0 otherwise.
Regulatory Indices - various sources
• ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they de-
cide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + regu-
lation (IEF))/4.
• PROCEDURES = number of procedures that are ofﬁcially required to
start and operate a new business. Source: Doing Business Database (The
World Bank Group), 2003.
• TIME= time in calendar days needed to complete procedures that are ofﬁ-
cially required to start and operate a new business. Source: Doing Business
Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• COST = cost (measured as a percentage of the country’s income per capita)
neededtocompleteproceduresthatareofﬁciallyrequired tostartandoperate
a new business. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group),
2003.
• REGULATION(IEF)=compositeindexmeasuringnotonlyhoweasy/difﬁcult
it is to operate a business but also examining the degree of corruption in the
government and whether or not regulation is applied uniformly to all busi-
nesses. Source: Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation),
variable name in IEF database: regulation, average 1995-2000.
• CONTRACT measures the efﬁciency of the justice system in resolving
commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureau-
cracy)/2.
• PROCEDURES=numberofproceduresrequiredtosolveadispute. Source:
Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY = index measuring the ability of the
government to operate without dramatic changes in policy or interruptions
of its services. Source: International Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group);
variable name in ICRG database: bureaucracy, average 1984-2000.
30• LABOR measures the difﬁculty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor
force. LABOR = (hiring index + ﬁring index + ﬁring costs + rigidity of
labor contracts + union density)/5.
• HIRINGINDEX =indexmeasuringtheavailabilityoftermcontractsfor
temporary/permanent task, the maximum cumulative duration of term con-
tracts, and the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or ﬁrst time employee
to the average value added per worker. Source: Doing Business Database
(The World Bank Group), 2003.
• FIRING INDEX = index measuring whether redundancy is disallowed
a sab a s i st oﬁre a worker, the need for the employer to notify a third party
and/or to get approval from a third party when ﬁring one redundant worker
and/or a group of more than 20 redundant workers, whether the law requires
the employer to consider retraining or reassignment before ﬁring a redundant
worker, whether priority rules apply for redundancies and reemployment.
Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• FIRINGCOST = index measuring the cost in weekly wages of advance
notice requirements, severance payments adn penalties due when terminat-
ing a redundant worker. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank
Group), 2003.
• RIGIDITY LABOR CONTRACTS = index measuring whether night
and/or weekend work is unrestricted, whether the workweek can consist of
5.5 days and/or can be extended to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for
2 months a year, whether paid annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer.
Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• UNIONDENSITYpercentageoftotalworkforceafﬁliatedtolaborunions
in 1997. Source: Djankov et al. (2004).
Countries’ groups
• LOW INCOME includes India. Source: World Bank’s classiﬁcation, see
www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /classgroups.htm.
• MIDDLE LOWINC includes Brazil, China, Thailand. Source: World
Bank’sclassiﬁcation, seewww.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm.
• UPPER MIDDLE INC includes Argentina, Chile, Croatia, Hungary,
Mexico, Poland, Russia, South Africa. Source: World Bank’s classiﬁcation,
see www.worldbank.org /data/countryclass /classgroups.htm.
31• HIGH INCOME includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Nether-
lands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, South
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, UnitedKingdom, UnitedStates. Source:
WorldBank’sclassiﬁcation, seewww.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/class-
groups.htm.
• OECD includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
• EU includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom;
• ECAincludes Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia.
• EAP includes China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thai-
land.
• LATINAMERICAincludes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico.
• Legal Origin :
• ENGLISH includes Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel,
New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, United
States. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
• SOCIALIST includes China, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia.
Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
• FRENCH includes Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, Mex-
ico, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. Source: Djankov et al. (2003)
• GERMAN includes Germany, Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan.
Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
• SCANDINAVIAN includesDenmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. Source:
Djankov et al. (2003).
32Appendix II: GEM questionnaires’ questions
The following are the questionnaires’ questions that the GEM coordination
team uses to generate the variables TEA, TEAOPP, TEANEC. Questions are
from the 2002 data documentation manual. Questions asked in 2001 were exactly
the same, even though the numbering of the questions changes. The methodology
followed to construct the indices is based on procedures previously used in the US
Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics and it is described in detail in the 2001
and 2002 Adult Population Surveys’ data documentation and in Reynolds et al.
(2005).
• 1. Which of the following would apply to you? (Possible answers: Yes, No,
Don’t Know, Refused)
• 1a. You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business,
including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others.
• 1b. You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or
a new venture for your employer– an effort that is part of your normal work.
• 1c. You are, alone or with others, currently the owner of a company you help
manage, self-employed, or selling any goods or services to others.
• If "Yes", Or “Don’t Know” To Qu. 1a or Qu. 1b, Ask Qu 2a. If “Yes”, Or
“Don’t Know” To Qu. 1c, Ask Qu. 3a.
• 2a. Over the past twelve months have you done anything to help start a new
business, such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up
team, working on a business plan, beginning to save money, or any other
activity that would help launch a business?
• 2b. Will you personally own all, part, or none of this business?
• 2d. Has the new business paid any salaries, wages, or payments in kind,
including your own, for more than three months?
• 2d1. What was the ﬁrst year the owners received wages, proﬁts, or payments
in kind?
• 2g. Are you involved in this start-up to take advantage of a business oppor-
tunity or because you have no better choices for work?
• 3a. Do you personally own all, part, or none of this business?
33• 3c. What was the ﬁrst year the owners received wages, proﬁts, or payments
in kind? Payments in kind refers to goods or services provided as payments
for work rather than cash.24
• 3g. Are you involved in this ﬁrm to take advantage of a business opportunity
or because you have no better choices for work.
The following are the questionnaires’ questions used to deﬁne the variables
Knowent, Skills,a n dFearfail, respectively. Questions are from the 2002 data
documentation manual. Questions asked in 2001 were exactly the same even
though the numbering of the questions changes.
• 1. Which of the following would apply to you? (Possible answers: Yes, No,
Don’t Know, Refused)
• 1g. You know someone personally who started a business in the past 2 years
• 1i. You have the knowledge, skill and experience required to start a new
business
• 1j. Fear of failure would prevent you from starting a business
24From this question, researchers can identify owners who have received wages, proﬁts, or pay-
ments in kind for no more than 42 months.
34Appendix III: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys
The questions from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys used to generate the vari-
ables TEA _Euro, TEAOPP_Euro, TEANEC_Euroin Table 3, column 2 are
as follows:
• 1) Have you started a business recently or are you taking steps to start a new
one? (Possible answers: a) It never came to my mind. b) No, but you are
thinking about it. c) No, you thought of it and you had already taken steps
to start a business but gave up. d) Yes, you are currently taking steps to
start a new business. e) Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the
last three years which is still active today. f) Yes, you started or took over
a business more than three years ago and it is still active. g) No, you once
started a business, but currently you are no longer an entrepreneur (business
has failed, business was sold or the interviewee has retired). h) Don’t Know).
• 2)All inall, wouldyousay youstarted, orarestarting, yourbusinessbecause
you saw an opportunity or you started it out of necessity? (Possible answers:
a) You started it because you came across an opportunity. b) You started it
because it was a necessity. c) Both. d) Don’t Know).
To create variables consitent with the ones in GEM, the indices TEA _Euro,
TEAOPP_Euro, TEANEC_Euroin Table 3, column 2 are deﬁned as follows:
• TEA_Euro= 1 if individuals replied “Yes, you are currently taking steps to
start a new business” or “Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the
last three years which is still active today” to question 1 above, 0 otherwise.
• TEAOPP_Euro = 1 if individuals replied “Yes, you are currently taking
steps to start a new business” or “Yes, you have started or taken over a busi-
nessin the last threeyears which is still active today” to question 1 above and
individuals replied “You started it because you came across an opportunity”
to question 2 above, 0 otherwise.
• TEANEC_Euro = 1 if individuals replied “Yes, you are currently taking
steps to start a new business” or “Yes, you have started or taken over a busi-
ness in the last three years which is still active today” to question 1 above
and individuals replied “You started it because it was a necessity” to question
2 above, 0 otherwise.
The questions from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys used to generate the vari-
able FEAR OF FAILURE_Euro in Table 3, column 2 is the following: do
35you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following opin-
ion? One should not start a business if there is a risk it might fails. FEAR OF
FAILURE_Euromeasures the percentage of people who strongly agree or agree
with this opinion.
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Table 1: Entrepreneurship rates 
  N. OF 
OBS  TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEANEC/ 
TEAOPP 
    mean s.dev mean s.dev mean s.dev   
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
ARGENTINA  3438  11.86  32.38 6.03 23.81 5.62 23.03  93.20 
AUSTRALIA   2785  9.17 28.87 7.23 25.90 1.43 11.88  19.78 
BELGIUM   4706  3.41 18.16 2.68 16.16 0.45  6.69 16.79 
BRAZIL   3930  13.68  34.37 7.10 25.68 6.52 24.69  91.83 
CANADA   4123  9.39 29.18 7.24 25.91 1.79 13.27  24.72 
CHILE   1975  16.01  36.68 9.03 28.67 6.54 24.74  72.43 
CHINA   2054  12.44  33.02 5.17 22.14 7.50 26.34  145.07 
CROATIA   1603  3.47 18.30 2.07 14.24  0.8  8.79 38.65 
DENMARK   3521  6.82 25.22 5.94 23.63  0.4  6.37  6.73 
FINLAND   2896  6.59 24.81 5.56 22.92  0.4  7.0  7.19 
FRANCE   3122  4.47 20.66 2.91 16.81 0.57  7.55 19.59 
GERMANY   16570  5.37 22.53 3.90 19.37 1.30 11.32  33.33 
HONG KONG  1638  3.41 18.17 2.26 14.86 1.16 10.71  51.33 
HUNGARY  4000  8.74 28.25 5.74 23.27 2.64 16.03  45.99 
INDIA   4961  13.11  33.76 7.11 25.70 5.67 23.12  79.75 
IRELAND   3194  10.18  30.14 8.11 27.30 1.65 12.76  20.35 
ISRAEL   3399  6.14 24.01 3.47 18.29 0.94  9.55 27.09 
ITALY   3486  7.40 26.18 5.11 22.01 1.20 10.91  23.48 
JAPAN   3659  2.43 15.41 1.31 11.38 0.85  9.17 64.89 
KOREA   3669  14.31  35.02 8.09 27.27 4.74 21.26  58.59 
MEXICO   2789  16.07  36.73 9.93 29.99 5.29 22.39  53.27 
NETHERLANDS   4317  5.06 21.92 4.36 20.42 0.43  6.56  9.86 
NEW ZEALAND   2967  14.69 35.42 12.13 32.66  2.39  15.28 19.70 
NORWAY   4009  7.85 26.90 6.66 24.94 0.26  5.07  3.90 
POLAND   3395  6.19 24.10 3.28 17.86 2.62 15.99  79.88 
PORTUGAL   2000  6.61 24.86 5.15 22.11 1.31 11.36  25.44 
RUSSIA   1795  2.54 15.71 1.90 13.67  0.5  7.44 26.32 
SINGAPORE   3872  6.02 23.78 4.85 21.50 1.01  9.99 20.82 
SLOVENIA   1692  4.43 20.58 3.14 17.44 1.29 11.27  41.08 
SOUTH AFRICA   10442  6.40 24.48 3.62 18.68 2.18 14.59  60.22 
SPAIN   3476  5.23 22.23 3.75 19.01 1.27 11.18  33.87 
SWEDEN   3552  4.84 21.46 4.00 19.60 0.67  8.13 16.75 
SWITZERLAND   1739  7.11 25.71 6.07 23.89 0.82  9.02 13.51 
TAIWAN  1977  4.22 20.11 3.27 17.80 0.72  8.44 22.02 
THAILAND   985  18.18 38.59 14.53 35.26  3.44  18.23 23.68 
UK  16923  5.57 22.94 4.28 20.25 0.80  8.89 18.69 
US  7953  10.73  30.95 9.34 29.10 1.18 10.81  12.63 
           
ALL  152612  7.61  26.52 5.3 22.40  1.89  13.61  35.66 
LOW INCOME  4961  13.11  33.76 7.11 25.70 5.67 23.12  79.75 
MIDDLE LOW INC  6969  13.94  34.64 7.56 26.44 6.38 24.44  84.39 
UPPER MIDDLE INC 29437  8.48 27.86 4.92 21.64 3.10 17.32  63.01 
HIGH INCOME  111245  6.74 25.08 5.17 22.16 1.13 10.56  21.86 
OECD  94998  6.65 24.92 5.26 22.33 1.00  9.98 19.01 
EU  67763  5.68 23.15 4.37 20.45  0.9  9.52 20.59 
ECA  12485  5.92 23.61 3.72 18.92 1.92 13.74  51.61 
EAP  14195  9.39 29.17 5.89 23.54 3.07 17.24  52.12 
LATIN AMERICA  12132  14.10  34.80 7.77 26.78 5.99 23.74  77.09 
ENGLISH  63242  8.24 27.51 6.04 23.83 1.74 13.07  28.81 
SOCIALIST  14539  6.86 25.28 3.93 19.42 2.72 16.28  69.21 
FRENCH  33239  8.36 27.67 5.27 22.34 2.65 16.07  50.28 
GERMAN  27614  6.20 24.11 4.21 20.08 1.63 12.67  38.72 
SCANDINAVIAN  13978  6.56 24.76 5.57 22.93 0.45  6.69  8.08 
Notes: TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are 
starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals 
are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Appendix I for 
the exact classification of countries in each group.   38
Table 2: Individual characteristics 
 ALL  LOW  INCOME  MIDDLE LOW 
INC 
UPPER MIDDLE 
INC  HIGH INCOME 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
AGE  39.35 38.56 36.32 37.36 40.09 
  (12.87) (10.93) (12.29) (13.14) (12.84) 
% MALE  49.35 53.20 52.12 48.22 49.30 
  (50.00) (49.90) (49.96) (49.97) (50.00) 
% WORKING  66.31 58.72 68.76 51.82 69.79 
  (47.27) (49.25) (46.35) (49.97) (45.92) 
% STUDENTS  4.77 3.35 3.64 7.48 4.21 
  (21.32) (17.99) (18.73) (26.30) (20.08) 
% RETIRED AND DISABLES  6.60 0.67 9.66 9.50 5.87 
  (24.82) (8.15) (29.54)  (29.32)  (23.50) 
% NOT WORKING  22.33 37.26 17.94 31.20 20.14 
  (41.64) (48.36) (38.37) (46.33) (40.10) 
%HIGH SCHOOL  38.30 15.47 11.41 39.77 40.30 
  (48.61) (36.16) (31.80) (48.94) (49.05) 
%COLLEGE  30.32 11.75 11.36 19.00 34.52 
  (45.97) (32.21) (31.74) (39.23) (47.54) 
% LOW INCOME  27.90 58.69 55.61 30.14 25.33 
  (44.85) (49.25) (49.69) (45.89) (43.49) 
% MIDDLE INCOME  40.15 33.37 30.52 38.83 41.12 
  (49.02) (47.16) (46.06) (48.74) (49.20) 
% UPPER INCOME  31.94 7.94 13.86  31.03  33.56 
  (46.63) (27.04) (34.56) (46.26) (47.22) 
% KNOWS ENTREPR  34.70 18.53 44.40 32.13 35.46 
  (47.60) (38.85) (49.69) (46.70) (47.84) 
% HAS SKILLS  40.57 40.39 46.88 40.49 40.20 
  (49.10) (49.07) (49.91) (49.09) (49.03) 
% FEAR OF FAILURE  33.74 26.63 37.11 29.92 34.78 
  (47.28) (44.20) (48.31) (45.79) (47.63) 
N. OF OBSERVATIONS 152612  4961  6969  29437  111245 
       
Notes: Standard deviation in parenthesis. AGE = age of the individual at the time of the interview;  WORKING = individuals who work at the time of the 
interview; STUDENTS individuals who are students at the time of the interview; RETIRED AND DISABLES = individuals who are retired or disable at the time 
of the interview; NOT WORKING = individuals who do not work and are not students, retired, or disable at the time of the interview; HIGH  SCHOOL = 
individuals with a high school degree; COLLEGE = individuals with at least a college degree; LOW INCOME = individuals with income in the lowest 33rd 
income percentile of their country's income distribution; MIDDLE INCOME = individuals with income in the middle 33rd income percentile of their 
country's income distribution; UPPER INCOME = individuals with income in the upper 33rd income percentile of their country's income distribution; 
KNOWS ENTREPR = individuals who know someone who has started a business in the recent past; HAS SKILLS individuals who think they have the 
knowledge, skills and experience to start a new business; FEAR OF FAILURE = individuals who answer that fear of failing can prevent them to start a new 
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Table 3: Comparisons between GEM data and Flash Eurobarometer data 
 
SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED IN GEM 
ALSO SURVEYD IN FLASH EUROBAROMETER 
(1) 
SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED IN FLASH 
EUROBAROMETER ALSO SURVEYED IN GEM 
(2) 




















TEA (total entrepreneurial 
activity) 
 








            
            
  ALL  ENTREPR NON  ENTREPR.  ALL  ENTREPR  NON 
ENTREPR. 
            
AGE 40.30  37.91  40.46  40.99  37.86  41.21 
 (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.27)  (0.08) 
 [88812]  [5586]  [83226]  [24526]  [1603]  [22923] 
% MALE 49.32  65.59  48.20  47.50  62.38  46.46 
 (0.17)  (0.64)  (0.17)  (0.32)  (1.21)  (0.33) 
 [88812]  [5586]  [83226]  [24526]  [1603]  [22923] 
% WORKING 69.60  85.94  68.49  69.07  84.98  67.96 
 (0.16)  (0.48)  (0.17)  (0.29)  (0.89)  (0.30) 
 [82465]  [5140]  [77325]  [24385]  [1598]  [22787] 
% FEAR OF FAILURE 34.85  19.84  35.89  44.99  34.51  45.73 
 (0.16)  (0.54)  (0.17)  (0.32)  (1.19)  (0.33) 
 [85721]  [5477]  [80244]  [24020]  [1579]  [22441] 
            
Notes: Standard errors of the mean in (). Number of observations in []. See aAppendix I and Appendix III for variables’ definitions. 
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Table 4: Entrepreneurship and individual characteristics in selected countries 
           
 US  CANADA  ITALY 
           
  TEA  TEAOPP TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP TEANEC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
AGE  0.0019  0.0016  0.0004  -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0004  -0.0043 -0.0027 0.0022 
  (0.99)  (0.89)  (0.61)  (-0.55) (-0.71) (0.47)  (-1.64)*  (-1.36) (2.06)** 
AGE SQUARE  -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.000006  0.000007 0.000007 -0.000005  0.000038 0.000024 -0.000028 
  (-1.48)  (-1.39)  (-0.77)  (0.22) (0.31) (-0.50)  (1.18) (0.98) (-2.07)** 
MALE  0.0112 0.0071 0.0019  0.0219 0.0169 0.0012 -0.0086  0.0007 -0.0036 
  (1.64)*  (1.14)  (0.84) (2.51)** (2.54)** (0.36)  (-1.00)  (0.11)  (-0.92) 
NOT WORKING  0.0076 -0.0044 0.0102  0.0072  -0.0220 0.0278  -0.0319 -0.029  0.0024 
  (0.73)  (-0.46)  (3.01)*** (0.42)  (-1.75)*  (3.24)***  (-3.38)*** (-4.13)*** (0.56) 
STUDENTS  -0.0209 -0.0164 -0.0012  -0.0292 -0.0291 0.0121  -0.0536 -0.0328 -0.0004 
  (-1.49) (-1.31) (-0.23)  (-1.32) (-2.06)**  (1.09)  (-4.55)***  (-3.70)***  (-0.05) 
RETIRED DISABLES        -0.0286 -0.0145 -0.0076 -0.0512 -0.0299  
       (-1.93)*  (-1.21)  (-1.56)  (-2.97)***  (-2.38)**   
HIGHSCHOOL  0.0283  0.0423 -0.0039  -0.0097 -0.0124 0.0037  -0.0092 -0.0016 -0.0114 
  (1.98)**  (2.86)***  (-1.36)  (-0.66) (-1.09) (0.67)  (-0.78) (-0.17) (-2.57)** 
COLLEGE  0.0266 0.0376 -0.0072  0.0039 0.0075 -0.0055  -0.0221  -0.0118  -0.0113 
  (2.09)**  (3.03)***  (-2.31)**  (0.29) (0.72) (-1.05)  (-1.63)  (-1.09)  (-2.56)** 
KNOWENT  0.0811 0.0703 0.0075  0.0892 0.0683 0.0128 0.0175 0.0105 0.0042 
  (10.65)***  (10.06)***  (2.99)***  (8.88)*** (8.35)*** (3.47)*** (2.03)**  (1.63)  (1.10) 
SKILLS  0.1196 0.1045 0.0115  0.0957 0.0746 0.0141 0.0846 0.0575 0.0091 
  (14.91)***  (13.63)***  (4.91)***  (9.26)*** (8.59)*** (3.47)*** (8.57)*** (7.38)*** (2.30)** 
FEARFAIL  -0.0064 -0.0100 0.0040  -0.0247 -0.0208 0.0023  -0.0253 -0.0185 -0.0036 
  (-0.74)  (-1.24)  (1.55)  (-2.58)**  (-2.84)*** (0.61)  (-2.89)*** (-2.69)*** (-1.04) 
OBSERVATIONS  7673 7673 7673  3840 3840 3840 2815 2815 2582 
 
           
 BRAZIL  CHINA  INDIA 
           
  TEA  TEAOPP TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP TEANEC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
AGE  0.0094  0.0060  0.0031 -0.0094 -0.0058 -0.0015 -0.0045 0.0019 -0.0061 
  (2.44)**  (2.19)** (1.19) (-1.31) (-1.32) (-0.27) (-0.96) (1.37) (-1.49) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.00011  -0.00007  -0.00004 0.00012 0.00007 0.00003 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00005 
  (-2.45)**  (-2.16)**  (-1.19) (1.35) (1.37) (0.37) (0.39) (-1.32) (0.84) 
MALE  -0.0129 -0.0020 -0.0091 -0.0268 0.0134 -0.0477 0.0106  0.0161 -0.0118 
  (-0.70) (-0.15) (-0.77) (-0.90) (1.15) (-1.76)* (0.43) (1.71)* (-0.64) 
NOT WORKING  -0.0888 -0.0470 -0.0358 -0.1001 -0.0296 -0.0763 -0.0557 0.0106 -0.0623 
  (-3.87)***  (-2.82)*** (-2.30)** (-3.90)***  (-1.93)*  (-3.77)*** (-2.08)**  (0.96)  (-3.00)*** 
STUDENTS  -0.0890 -0.0559 -0.0246 -0.0712 -0.0157    -0.0642 0.0080 -0.0501 
 (-2.59)***  (-2.40)**  (-0.98)  (-1.39)  (-0.58)    (-2.00)**  (0.37)  (-2.61)*** 
RETIRED DISABLES -0.0784 -0.0475 -0.0259 -0.1138 -0.0347         
  (-4.27)***  (-3.51)*** (-2.06)** (-4.67)*** (-2.47)**         
HIGHSCHOOL  -0.0790 -0.0416 -0.0346 -0.0217 0.0016 -0.0210 0.0982  0.0419  0.0375 
 (-1.77)*  (-1.24)  (-1.32)  (-0.71)  (0.13)  (-0.80)  (3.65)***  (3.41)***  (1.87)* 
COLLEGE  0.0122 0.0097 0.0005 -0.0624 0.0035 -0.0730 0.0881 0.0213 0.0610 
  (0.36)  (0.40)  (0.02) (-2.56)** (0.25)  (-3.94)***  (2.91)***  (2.10)**  (2.36)** 
KNOWENT  0.0734 0.0512 0.0192 0.0808 0.0270 0.0502 0.0108 0.0289 -0.0265 
  (4.40)***  (4.26)*** (1.74)* (2.87)***  (1.97)** (2.06)**  (0.48)  (3.23)*** (-1.69)* 
SKILLS  0.0911 0.0411 0.0474 0.1105 0.0697 0.0464 0.0973 0.0238 0.0583 
  (5.50)*** (3.36)*** (4.31)*** (3.36)*** (4.62)***  (1.60)  (4.53)*** (2.90)*** (3.21)*** 
FEARFAIL  -0.0414 -0.0414 0.0025 -0.0085 0.0004 -0.0045 -0.0470 -0.0129 -0.0282 
  (-2.57)**  (-3.51)***  (0.24) (-0.29) (0.03) (-0.19)  (-2.58)***  (-2.42)**  (-1.91)* 
OBSERVATIONS  1854 1854 1854 1782 1782 1475 1771 1771 1771 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and a time dummy for 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Marginal effects 
(not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if 
individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or 
are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business 
or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the 
exact definition of the variables. 
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Table 5: Regulatory indices 
 ENTRY  CONTRACT  LABOR 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
ARGENTINA 0.468  0.581  0.583 
AUSTRALIA  0.176  0.060  0.186 
BELGIUM  0.392  0.155  0.356 
BRAZIL  0.756  0.621  0.412 
CANADA  0.088  0.036  0.121 
CHILE  0.298  0.562  0.271 
CHINA  0.593  0.592  0.318 
CROATIA  0.574  0.402  0.631 
DENMARK  0.123  0.012  0.317 
FINLAND  0.253  0.165  0.565 
FRANCE  0.287  0.094  0.484 
GERMANY  0.383  0.190  0.507 
HONG KONG 0.076  0.249  0.112 
HUNGARY 0.492  0.204  0.440 
INDIA  0.795  0.710  0.397 
IRELAND  0.202  0.060  0.411 
ISRAEL  0.212  0.265  0.369 
ITALY  0.383  0.459  0.510 
JAPAN  0.332  0.079  0.249 
KOREA  0.450  0.333  0.389 
MEXICO  0.542  0.629  0.467 
NETHERLANDS  0.294  0.095  0.418 
NEW ZEALAND  0.101  0.167  0.105 
NORWAY  0.251  0.044  0.570 
POLAND  0.448  0.528  0.330 
PORTUGAL  0.500  0.345  0.633 
RUSSIA  0.481  0.702  0.507 
SINGAPORE  0.098  0.251  0.053 
SLOVENIA  0.449  0.341   
SOUTH AFRICA  0.304  0.300  0.446 
SPAIN  0.565  0.291  0.578 
SWEDEN  0.210  0.060  0.563 
SWITZERLAND  0.304  0.095  0.243 
TAIWAN 0.289  0.322  0.609 
THAILAND  0.349  0.354  0.211 
UK 0.167  0.060  0.193 
US 0.141  0.036  0.025 
      
ALL 0.320  0.231  0.363 
LOW INCOME 0.795  0.710  0.397 
MIDDLE LOW INC 0.649  0.573  0.356 
UPPER MIDDLE INC 0.416  0.443  0.457 
HIGH INCOME 0.262  0.142  0.338 
OECD 0.262  0.120  0.344 
EU 0.295  0.143  0.409 
ECA 0.483  0.455  0.456 
EAP 0.298  0.335  0.276 
LATIN AMERICA 0.547  0.601  0.455 
ENGLISH 0.219  0.170  0.226 
SOCIALIST 0.495  0.470  0.438 
FRENCH 0.442  0.346  0.465 
GERMAN 0.374  0.197  0.454 
SCANDINAVIAN 0.212  0.069  0.507 
NOTES: ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + 
regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of 
bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + 
rigidity of labor contracts + union density)/5. See also Appendix I.   42
Table 6: Correlation among regulatory indices the components of the indices 
REGULATION 
     
 E NTRY C ONTRACT L ABOR    
ENTRY  1      
CONTRACT 0.75  1       
LABOR  0.50 0.27 1     
       
 
ENTRY REGULATION       
 P ROCEDURES T IME C OST R EGUL. (IEF)  
PROCEDURES  1      
TIME 0.70  1       
COST  0.46 0.49 1     
REGULATION (IEF)  0.38 0.47 0.52 1   
       
 
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT REG.       
 P ROCEDURES  QUALITY OF 
BUREAUCRACY     
PROCEDURES  1      
QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY 0.50  1       
       
 
LABOR MARKET REG.       
 H IRING INDEX F IRING INDEX F IRING COST  RIGIDITY LABOR 
CONTRACTS  UNION DENSITY 
HIRING INDEX  1      
FIRING INDEX 0.47  1       
FIRING COST  0.28 0.23 1     
RIGIDITY LABOR CONTRACTS  0.39 0.33 0.18 1   
UNION DENSITY  0.01 0.11 -0.16  0.38 1 
       
       
Notes: ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + 
regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of 
bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + 
rigidity of labor contracts + union density)/5. See also Appendix I. 
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Table 7: Entrepreneurship and personal characteristics 
 TEA=1  TEA=0  ST. ERR. OF 
DIFF  TEAOPP=1 TEANEC=1 ST. ERR. OF 
DIFF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
        
AGE 37.50  39.50  0.12
** 37.07 38.24 0.24
** 
% MALE 64.84  48.08  0.48
** 66.37 60.98 1.04
** 
% WORKING 84.75  64.83  0.49
** 86.46 80.24 0.86
** 
% STUDENTS 2.12  4.99  0.22
** 2.23  1.69  0.34 
% RETIRED AND DISABLED 2.01  6.96  0.26
** 1.92  2.18  0.32 
% NOT WORKING 11.13  23.22  0.43
** 9.39 15.89  0.75
** 
%HIGH SCHOOL 35.59  38.51  0.50
** 35.43 34.75  1.12 
% COLLEGE 37.39  29.76  0.48
** 42.30 22.79 1.13
** 
% LOW INCOME 24.20  28.20  0.54
** 19.76 37.33 1.14
** 
% MIDDLE INCOME 35.56  40.52  0.59
** 34.79 37.78 1.31
** 
% UPPER INCOME 40.24  31.28  0.55
** 45.46 24.89 1.31
** 
% KNOWS ENTREPR 62.67  32.38  0.45
** 66.54 53.13 1.04
** 
% HAS SKILLS 81.52  37.14  0.46
** 84.59 74.22 0.84
** 
% FEAR OF FAILURE 21.87  34.74  0.46
** 19.12 29.60 0.90
** 
        
Notes: Difference in mean statistically different from zero at 5% (**) / 10% (*). TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and 
managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take 
advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm 
because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the exact definition of the variables. 
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Table 8: Entrepreneurship and individual characteristics 
        
 TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AGE  0.0020 0.0012 0.0006 0.0019 0.0012 0.0005 
  (3.20)***  (3.03)***  (2.32)** (2.38)** (2.42)**  (1.39) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.00003  -0.00002 -0.000008 -0.00003  -0.00002 -0.000006 
  (-4.10)*** (-3.91)*** (-2.66)*** (-3.19)*** (-3.26)***  (-1.65)* 
MALE  0.0112 0.0082 0.0017 0.0116 0.0082 0.0017 
 (5.67)***  (6.28)***  (1.97)**  (5.36)***  (5.51)***  (1.50) 
NOT WORKING  -0.0235 -0.0150 -0.0045 -0.0231 -0.0134 -0.0055 
  (-6.20)*** (-7.22)*** (-2.96)*** (-5.00)*** (-5.49)*** (-3.00)*** 
STUDENTS  -0.0295 -0.0169 -0.0071 -0.0280 -0.0146 -0.0080 
  (-7.68)*** (-7.63)*** (-3.88)*** (-5.08)*** (-4.21)*** (-3.86)*** 
RETIRED DISABLES  -0.0287 -0.0167 -0.0067 -0.0270 -0.0147 -0.0070 
  (-5.70)*** (-4.08)*** (-4.44)*** (-3.91)*** (-2.86)*** (-2.86)*** 
HIGHSCHOOL 0.0029 0.0062 -0.0020 0.0034 0.0058 -0.0013 
 (1.13)  (3.42)***  (-1.69)*  (1.05)  (2.70)***  (-0.83) 
COLLEGE  0.0028 0.0102 -0.0058 0.0010 0.0071 -0.0051 
 (0.88)  (5.83)***  (-4.34)***  (0.27)  (3.38)***  (-2.62)*** 
KNOWENT  0.0429 0.0304 0.0056 0.0435 0.0293 0.0068 
  (14.63)***  (15.95)*** (5.43)*** (14.33)***  (15.70)*** (5.03)*** 
SKILLS  0.0848 0.0591 0.0148 0.0867 0.0604 0.0160 
  (29.02)*** (25.58)*** (16.14)*** (25.54)*** (24.09)*** (15.54)*** 
FEARFAIL  -0.0200 -0.0152 -0.0012 -0.0201 -0.0147 -0.0016 
 (-9.19)***  (-9.07)***  (-1.64)*  (-7.30)***  (-7.32)***  (-2.14)** 
LOWESTINC       0.0066  0.0004  0.0038 
       (1.71)*  (0.16)  (2.12)** 
UPPERINC     0.0069  0.0065  -0.0022 
       (2.01)**  (2.38)**  (-1.62) 
OBSERVATIONS 118525  118525  118525  83397  83397  83397 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and a time dummy for 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Marginal effects 
(not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if 
individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or 
are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business 
or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the 
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Table 9: Entrepreneurship and regulation 


















  TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
AGE  0.0022  0.0013  0.0007  0.0021 0.0012 0.0007  0.0025  0.0015  0.0007 
  (3.78)*** (3.37)*** (3.64)***  (3.39)***  (2.96)***  (3.48)***  (3.64)*** (3.54)***  (2.77)*** 
AGE SQUARE  -0.00003  -0.00002  -0.000008 -0.00003  -0.00002  -0.000009 -0.00003  -0.00002  -0.000008 
  (-4.11)***  (-3.95)***  (-3.05)***  (-4.11)*** (-3.82)*** (-3.25)***  (-4.24)***  (-4.15)***  (-2.6)*** 
MALE  0.0164  0.0076  0.0056  0.0141 0.0076 0.0046  0.0125  0.0066  0.0038 
  (4.31)*** (2.77)*** (3.92)***  (5.44)***  (3.94)***  (4.30)***  (3.01)***  (2.46)**  (2.35)** 
NOT WORKING -0.0058 -0.0091 0.0043  -0.0125  -0.0107  0.0007  -0.0100 -0.0068  -0.0015 
  (-0.78) (-1.72)* (1.41)  (-2.44)** (-3.41)***  (0.29)  (-1.17) (-1.73)*  (-0.31) 
STUDENTS  -0.0148  -0.0112  0.0009  -0.0218 -0.0145 -0.0034  -0.0201  -0.0155  0.0055 
 (-1.60)  (-1.86)*  (0.15)  (-3.79)***  (-3.98)***  (-1.07)  (-1.51)  (-2.14)**  (0.96) 
RET. DIS.  -0.0259  -0.0153  -0.0059  -0.0240 -0.0144 -0.0051  -0.0285  -0.0162  -0.0067 
 (-2.74)***  (-1.95)*  (-2.48)**  (-3.53)***  (-2.77)***  (-2.31)**  (-2.48)**  (-1.91)*  (-2.7)*** 
HIGHSCHOOL  -0.0036 0.0024 -0.0056  0.0016  0.0037  -0.0033  -0.0002 0.0053  -0.0038 
 (-0.48)  (0.49)  (-2.52)**  (0.38)  (1.17)  (-2.07)**  (-0.03)  (1.16)  (-2.6)*** 
COLLEGE  0.0011 0.0072 -0.0084  0.0038  0.0082  -0.0067  0.0034 0.0103  -0.0074 
 (0.14)  (1.61)  (-3.43)***  (0.84)  (2.68)***  (-4.19)***  (0.61)  (2.54)**  (-5.7)*** 
KNOWENT  0.0601  0.0399  0.0082  0.0537 0.0356 0.0088  0.0616  0.0426  0.0082 
  (12.73)***  (11.09)***  (4.32)*** (15.99)***  (14.43)***  (6.59)*** (12.34)***  (12.01)***  (5.11)*** 
SKILLS  0.0972  0.0701  0.0144  0.0938 0.0672 0.0145  0.0864  0.0609  0.0130 
  (24.95)***  (21.95)***  (11.52)***  (27.58)*** (24.19)*** (12.45)***  (15.83)***  (19.49)***  (7.24)*** 
FEARFAIL  -0.0151 -0.0117 0.0021  -0.0170  -0.0137  0.0017  -0.0104 -0.0090 0.0030 
  (-3.83)*** (-3.94)***  (1.55)  (-5.13)***  (-5.36)***  (1.85)*  (-3.04)*** (-3.53)*** (2.64)*** 
R*AGE  -0.0009  -0.0005  -0.0003  -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0013  -0.0009  -0.0002 
  (-1.22)  (-0.88)  (-0.85)  (-1.00) (-0.56) (-1.01)  (-1.46)  (-1.46)  (-1.22) 
R*MALE  -0.0184  0.0016  -0.0114  -0.0153 0.0018 -0.0104  -0.0043  0.0044  -0.0058 
 (-1.75)*  (0.21)  (-2.85)***  (-1.78)*  (0.29)  (-3.04)***  (-0.44)  (0.62)  (-1.74)* 
R*NOT WORK.  -0.0639  -0.0237  -0.0245  -0.0519 -0.0227 -0.0186  -0.0466  -0.0299  -0.0095 
  (-3.07)***  (-1.45)  (-3.47)***  (-3.35)*** (-1.94)* (-2.98)***  (-2.26)**  (-2.68)***  (-0.87) 
R*STUDENTS  -0.0801  -0.0342  -0.0332  -0.0553 -0.0194 -0.0217  -0.0519  -0.0100  -0.0434 
  (-2.73)*** (-1.57) (-2.49)** (-2.90)***  (-1.34)  (-2.48)**  (-1.14)  (-0.37) (-3.4)*** 
R* RET. DIS -0.0166  -0.0095  -0.0039  -0.0386 -0.0213 -0.0100  0.0006  -0.0010  0.0012 
 (-0.61)  (-0.44)  (-0.51)  (-2.08)**  (-1.81)*  (-1.13)  (0.02)  (-0.04)  (0.11) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL  0.0205  0.0114  0.0104  0.0070 0.0104 0.0045  0.0076  0.0019  0.0047 
  (0.82)  (0.71)  (1.64)*  (0.34) (0.84) (0.82)  (0.59)  (0.17)  (1.22) 
R*COLLEGE 0.0034  0.0080  0.0095  -0.0048  0.0071  0.0039  -0.0036  -0.0012  0.0054 
  (0.13) (0.65) (1.01)  (-0.24)  (0.75)  (0.53)  (-0.27)  (-0.13)  (1.35) 
R*KNOWENT  -0.0421  -0.0228  -0.0061  -0.0373 -0.0184 -0.0092  -0.0406  -0.0258  -0.0059 
  (-3.85)*** (-2.78)***  (-1.27)  (-4.09)***  (-2.78)***  (-2.42)**  (-3.41)*** (-3.60)***  (-1.24) 
R*SKILLS  -0.0273 -0.0227 0.0004  -0.0270  -0.0235  0.0003  -0.0027 -0.0032 0.0032 
 (-2.68)***  (-2.35)**  (0.15)  (-2.54)**  (-2.58)***  (0.12)  (-0.21)  (-0.37)  (0.87) 
R*FEARFAIL  -0.0170  -0.0130  -0.0089  -0.0125 -0.0066 -0.0095  -0.0306  -0.0205  -0.0110 
 (-1.45)  (-1.42)  (-2.55)**  (-1.26)  (-0.86)  (-3.90)***  (-3.08)***  (-2.57)**  (-4.1)*** 
OBSERVATIONS  118525 118525 118525  118525  118525  118525  116978 116978  116978 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and a time dummy for 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Marginal effects 
(not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if 
individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or 
are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business 
or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise; ENTRY measures the barriers and costs 
entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the 
efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the 
difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + rigidity of labor contracts + union 
density)/5. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the exact definition of the variables. 
   46
Table 10: Entrepreneurship and regulation – Instrumental variables estimation (weighted data) 
 


















 TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
AGE  0.0020  0.0014  0.0004  0.0019 0.0012 0.0006 0.0022  0.0016  0.0004 
 (2.20)**  (2.39)**  (0.80)  (1.91)*  (1.94)*  (1.08)  (2.47)**  (2.79)***  (0.88) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000 
  (2.64)** (2.88)***  (1.62)  (2.69)**  (2.82)***  (1.70)*  (3.10)*** (3.37)*** (1.91)* 
MALE  0.0254  0.0158  0.0079  0.0207 0.0127 0.0074 0.0241  0.0145  0.0064 
 (4.03)***  (3.19)***  (2.04)**  (3.94)***  (2.93)***  (2.32)**  (3.53)***  (2.60)**  (2.16)** 
NOT WORKING  -0.0071  -0.0098  0.0038  -0.0149 -0.0106 -0.0029 -0.0165  -0.0134  -0.0014 
  (0.51)  (1.15)  (0.45)  (1.22) (1.53) (0.38) (1.03)  (1.40)  (0.15) 
STUDENTS  -0.0212  -0.0187  -0.0006  -0.0291 -0.0233 -0.0034 -0.0286  -0.0231  -0.0027 
 (1.64)  (1.81)*  (0.07)  (2.40)**  (2.48)**  (0.51)  (1.44)  (1.73)*  (0.19) 
RET. DIS  -0.0318  -0.0288  0.0037 -0.0322  -0.0265  0.0003  -0.0373 -0.0316 0.0001 
 (1.81)*  (1.85)*  (0.71)  (2.17)**  (1.91)*  (0.09)  (1.76)*  (1.67)  (0.02) 
HIGHSCHOOL  0.0153  0.0177  -0.0022  0.0110 0.0114 0.0001 0.0063  0.0153  -0.0089 
  (1.21)  (2.26)**  (0.26)  (1.35) (1.93)*  (0.01) (0.52)  (1.96)*  (0.91) 
COLLEGE  0.0134  0.0148  -0.0027  0.0098  0.0115  -0.0023  0.0054 0.0169 -0.0144 
  (0.96)  (1.90)*  (0.27)  (1.10) (2.04)**  (0.33) (0.39)  (2.22)**  (1.43) 
KNOWENT  0.0915  0.0838  0.0009  0.0764 0.0680 0.0034 0.1074  0.0948  0.0052 
  (7.84)*** (7.82)*** (0.18)  (7.48)***  (7.37)***  (0.89)  (10.81)*** (11.42)*** (1.06) 
SKILLS  0.1029  0.0865  0.0099  0.1042 0.0871 0.0109 0.1039  0.0779  0.0207 
  (5.90)***  (5.94)***  (1.44)  (7.70)***  (7.46)***  (2.57)**  (5.19)*** (4.93)*** (2.10)** 
FEARFAIL  -0.0191  -0.0236  0.0061 -0.0205  -0.0241  0.0049  -0.0220 -0.0220 0.0022 
  (2.78)***  (3.95)***  (2.98)***  (3.82)*** (5.15)*** (2.89)*** (3.07)***  (3.72)***  (0.74) 
R*AGE  -0.0009  -0.0010  0.0007 -0.0004  -0.0003  0.0006  -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0007 
  (0.66)  (0.89)  (1.08)  (0.34) (0.38) (0.95) (0.58)  (0.87)  (0.98) 
R*MALE  -0.0373  -0.0132  -0.0187  -0.0321 -0.0056 -0.0242 -0.0272  -0.0070  -0.0115 
  (1.80)*  (0.87)  (1.27)  (1.35) (0.33) (1.36) (1.50)  (0.46)  (1.32) 
R*NOT WORK.  -0.0760  -0.0326  -0.0409  -0.0727 -0.0417 -0.0285 -0.0402  -0.0178  -0.0221 
  (1.60)  (1.25)  (1.37)  (1.59) (1.74)*  (0.86) (0.83)  (0.66)  (0.86) 
R*STUDENTS  -0.0970  -0.0525  -0.0409  -0.0930 -0.0510 -0.0390 -0.0647  -0.0332  -0.0304 
  (1.96)*  (1.60)  (1.41)  (1.81)*  (1.46)  (1.31)  (1.02) (0.85) (0.73) 
R* RET. DIS  -0.0121  0.0250  -0.0492  -0.0158 0.0224  -0.0515 0.0078  0.0342  -0.0341 
  (0.25)  (0.63)  (2.41)**  (0.33)  (0.54)  (2.70)**  (0.14) (0.76) (1.56) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL  -0.0427  -0.0405  -0.0036  -0.0420 -0.0304 -0.0150 -0.0124  -0.0282  0.0152 
  (1.29)  (1.93)*  (0.15)  (1.42) (1.50) (0.73) (0.46)  (1.53)  (0.73) 
R*COLLEGE  -0.0390  -0.0076  -0.0264  -0.0373 0.0042  -0.0385 -0.0120  -0.0137  0.0110 
  (0.94)  (0.31)  (0.84)  (0.97) (0.17) (1.32) (0.37)  (0.68)  (0.48) 
R*KNOWENT  -0.1004  -0.1116  0.0251 -0.0735  -0.0865  0.0247  -0.1292 -0.1255 0.0098 
  (3.01)***  (3.69)***  (1.75)*  (1.86)* (2.54)**  (1.72)* (5.13)***  (6.04)***  (0.78) 
R*SKILLS  -0.0112  -0.0401  0.0344 -0.0215  -0.0600  0.0454  -0.0121 -0.0096 -0.0011 
  (0.24)  (1.07)  (1.64)  (0.43)  (1.44)  (2.40)**  (0.26) (0.26) (0.05) 
R*FEARFAIL  -0.0325  -0.0052  -0.0269  -0.0381 -0.0027 -0.0340 -0.0215  -0.0102  -0.0124 
  (1.49)  (0.30)  (3.32)***  (1.52)  (0.13)  (4.26)***  (1.14) (0.68) (1.51) 
OBSERVATIONS  118525  118525  118525  118525 118525 118525 116978  116978  116978 
 
Notes: IV regressions including country fixed effects and a time dummy for 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Instruments for the 
regulatory variable R are dummy variables measuring English (common law), French (civil law), Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal origin. 
Coefficients and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if 
individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or 
are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business 
or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Notes to Table 2 and Appendix I for the 
exact definition of the variables. 
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 Figure 1: Entrepreneurship across the world 
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